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BOOK REVIEWS
INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS. Prepared by The Legislative
Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University. New York:
Oceana Press, 1959. $20.00.
This is a revision of the first edition of Index Digest of State
Constitution prepared in 1915 for the use of the New York State
Constitutional Convention of that year. Both the first and the present
second edition were prepared by the Legislative Drafting Research
Fund of Columbia University. The editor of the present volume was
Richard A. Edwards, who worked with the aid of associate editors
James L. Blawie and Marilyn B. Blawie.
Over forty years have passed since the first Index Digest appeared.
This has been a period of some rewriting of state constitutions,
considerable amending, and the addition of two new ones. The urge
to constitutional change has not abated, and this volume will be
useful for further rewriting of the basic documents.
The arrangement of this digest is the normal one. Constitutional
provisions are cataloged under approximately five hundred major
titles, with subtitles appropriate to the subject dealt with. The titles
themselves disclose the familiar mixture in state constitutions of the
sublime and the ridiculous. Two items away from the title, "The
Congress of the United States," is an entry for "Concealed Weapons";
and "Gas Companies" rest, fortuitously, next to "Government, Theory
of." But the titles themselves appear well and carefully chosen.
Verbatim excerpts from the constitutions are not given, for reasons
of space, but passages are summarized with care. Case annotations
are beyond the scope of the project.
There can be no doubt that this will be a standard reference work.
No library useful for the study of American constitutional law can
afford to be without it.
LEE S. GREENE
PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER. By Paul Harbrecht.
York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1959. Pp. 319. $5.00.

New

Whenever man's culture has been urban he has concerned himself
with the large question of personal economic security, in particular
the prospect of his condition under the burdens of disability, age, and
death. Indeed, it is this concern that has so often caused the citydweller to consider enviously the situation of his otherwise despised
country cousin. The latter generally has a certain anticipation of food,
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
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of shelter, and of care at each stage of his life, partly because of the
economic structure incident to agrarian life and partly because of the
expansive family organization normal in agricultural society. Unfortunately, the very factors that compel the creation of the city
render the level of living and aspiration enjoyed by rustics distasteful to those accustomed to other, more varied if not higher, levels.
In order to cope with this problem in the city environment of nuclear families and of utter dependence upon money incomes, city
dwellers have devised several sorts of relief. One of the oldest is
the gratuity dispensed by the state either for patriotic services or for
reasons of general public welfare. From the time of the Gracchi until
today, this has been a popular method of providing a guise of security
in a place where the illusion of security normally is not. Another
ancient form of care lies in the religious institutions that dispense
alms to the indigent who periodically apply for them. Unfortunately
for both of these, there has always been, and there is today, an air
of generosity-lavished-upon-ingratitude inherent in too many of these
programs for them to apply to more than a trifling segment of the
population. The average person has never considered with equanimity
the chance that he might someday reside in the county farm for the
aged poor, or receive township pauper relief, or take charity at the
bread-and-milk bursary of some conventual order.'
Because of this, other means have been developed to handle the
problem. Of these means, less redolent of charity, were the funds of
the guilds for the maintenance of aged and infirm members and for
the support of their survivors. With the decline of the guild economy,
coupled with the confiscatory measures of the English reformation,
the place of these funds was taken by the provident society and the
fraternal order. Humble at first, with a concern solely that the member be respectably buried, they eventually branched out to operate
life insurance, health insurance, and general relief programs for their
members or their members' families. 2 The value of these schemes
was limited by their dependence upon a common craft, as in the
case of most provident and friendly societies, or upon common religious beliefs or a similar socio-economic background, as in the
case of fraternal orders. They did not provide protection for the
bulk of the population, in any case, and in the nineteenth century,
which saw their fastest expansion, other methods were tried to supplement them.
1. Clarke, Widows', Orphans', and Old Age Pensions, in SOCIAL SECURITY
168 (3rd ed. Robson 1948).
2. For the importance of these organizations today in the role of securers
of security, see Clarke, Social Security Housekeeping, id. at 380. For their
medieval origins, see COULTON, MEDIEVAL PANORAmA 290 (1938), on socialreligious guilds.
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Certain voluntary plans for pensions relating to certain workers in
particular industries were set up, of which the Russian miners'
pension scheme is typical. Created in 1881, it made up the fund for
the payment of pension benefits out of wage deductions of 2 to 3 per
3
cent of payroll matched by equal contributions from the employer.
In addition to this kind of experiment, certain continental countries
after 1850, notably France, Belgium, Italy and Spain, set up voluntary
savings plans that amounted to almost straight government annuities. For instance, under the subsidized plan in Belgium, a deposit of
18 francs within three years gave the depositor the right to a life
pension of 65 francs. 4 At the same time that the Latin countries tried
this approach, other countries, led by Germany (1889), set up state5
operated compulsory contributory pension plans, while others, led
by Denmark (1891), set up state-operated compulsory non-contributory pension plans, 6 both types with the same purpose of rewarding
the worthy worker with honorable care in his old age. From these
experiments, initiated in the last half of the nineteenth century, have
7
come the institutions with which the worker today is concerned.
'The growth of such institutions, originally intended to assure a
kind of security for a difficult period in most men's lives, has occurred
in a slow manner; and it has produced results not to have been
anticipated by the early formulators of these programs. But the
changes are enormous and inexorable. In 1925 in the United States
there were fewer than two hundred purely private pension systems
and these made a very meager contribution to the economy. A prime
example was the pension scheme of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
8
which in thirty-five years paid pensions to only 2,759 persons. By
1959, over 25 per cent of the country's working population was covered
by all types of private pension plans with assets of $33 billion, grow9
ing at the rate of over $4 billion per year. Much progress has been
made in this guise of "assuring to the worker a reward so liberal
that it will overcome his normal reluctance to work"' 0 by freeing
3. KovALivsKy, LA RussIE A LA FIN DE 19 SIECLE 568 (1900).
4. RUBINOW,SOCIAL INSURANCE 342 (1913).

5. Id. at 345.

6. APPROACHES TO SOCIAL SECUITY, International Labour Office, Series M

at 6 (No. 18 1942).
7. Murphy, Financing Old Age and Survivors' Insurance: Description of a
Controversy, 6 J. PUB.L. 55, 71-78 (1957).
8. BLu , LABOR ECONOMICS 163 (1925). For different figures see HARBRECHT
at 6, a difference probably accounted for by Blum's exclusion of Massachusetts and Wisconsin pension funds as subsidized funds.
9. HARBREcHT at 3.
10. BOGART & LANDON, MODERN INDUSTRY 97 (2d ed., 1939).

Interestingly

enough, this text, first published in 1927, does not consider pensions as matters
of concern to the psychology of the worker or to a full utilization of human
resources, thus indicating how rapidly attitudes can change. Today, no writer
would feel he had covered the subject if he neglected to mention pensions.
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him from the pressing worry of becoming a cast off of the industry in
which he has spent his life.
From the inception of pensions, employers have insisted that pensions are exclusively under their control to "serve a special purpose in
industrial betterment work"" and, as compared to profit-sharing
schemes, that pensions represent "largess from the company to its
recipient workers."' 2 In the past, even employee representatives have
regarded the management of the pensions of a company as one of the
functions of management to which workers might aspire but to which
their admission represented a great concession of power by the owners.13 As one writer in the field put it as late as 1947, "companies
prefer to support the plan themselves because control of the plan
rests in their hands alone. Otherwise, the employees want to share
in the administration of the plan and are more demanding because
of the contributions they have made."' 4 The practice of both employer
and employee sharing the cost of old-age and disability pensions, so
early established in the case of the costs of health insurance and never
permitted in the case of workmen's compensation insurance costs, has
been a long time coming, if it is here yet; 15 and a sharing of the
control of the pension program with the workers remains the uncommon practice.
The result of this history has been the location of a considerable
amount of economic power in the hands of management with the
advent of pensions and other benefits regarded as a "fringe" to the
pay-packet. Despite loose talk of a new "people's capitalism", the
workers, who are the beneficiaries of these programs, are at a remote
remove from the exercise of control over any part of the programs
either directly, through individual initiative expressed in law suits,
or indirectly, through union representation on a pension management
board. Of course, in an organized concern, where pensions are a part
of the general labor-management contract, there are real, if peripheral, pressures which can be brought upon management; but there
is rarely any direct exercise of power. In addition to this point,
which might be dismissed as cavilling at the bad teeth in a gift horse's
mouth, is the reduced social mobility of all workers and the job fixation impressed upon all workers in the age bracket 45 to 65 by the
pension program. Even young workers have proven reluctant to leave
11. Dennis, Helping Employees to Save, in

HANDLING

MEN 191 (1917).

12. Farrell, ProfitSharing: When? Why? How?, id. at 161.

13.

SELEKMAN,

SHARING

MANAGEMENT

WITH

WORKERS

20, 77 (1924).

14. Jucius, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 602 (1951). This author still favored
employee contributions, however, because: (1) "The employees take a per* sonal interest in the pension plan and, hence, tend to appreciate such plans the
more," and (2) "since the costs are shared, the expense to the company is
lower."
15. FALi, SECURITY AGAINST SIcKNEss 44 (1936).
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their employment where a security program is in effect, while workers over 45 have found it impossible to do so, unless they are willing
to go into uncovered employment. Perhaps the federal social security
program ought to have taken up the difference, and it may even have
been intended to do so, but the effect of the inflation over the last
generation has effectively prevented it from serving as such a
buffer.16
Unfortunately, however, the problem of worker immobility under
the employee security programs is a much larger one than mere talk
about federal deficiency or supplementary security projects would
indicate. The book reviewed here expresses the primary concern of
its author, Father Harbrecht of the Jesuit Institute of Social Order
at St. Louis, with this critical situation. So long as ours is a system
of private, separately constituted entrepreneurs, the private security
programs will be marked in the future, as they have been in the
past,17 with unclassifiable variety. Even if all private industry should
set up employee security programs, there would still be substantial
differences between programs. In addition, these programs will continue to be separately funded (even if their separateness should be on
an industry-wide basis) and for actuarial purposes the fund or account managers will continue to' want to protect the fund from the
poor health risk, if the fund covers sickness insurance, or from the
hiring of older persons, if it is a retirement fund. Indeed, the bitter
experience of the early teachers' and ministers' retirement funds in
the United States has drilled into actuaries the value of "safeguarding" reserves from the eleemosynary influence.' 8 At the same time,
this results in the exercise of a greater influence on the part of
established workers in a plant vis-a-vis younger or newer employees,
with all of the consequences for friction and fossilization thereby
risked. 19 It can also be anticipated that areas of the country that are
able to resist or postpone the expansion of the employee security programs will be in an advantageous position to attract fleeing industry.
This would be so especially in the case of the South where high birth
rates and a normally high migration level have produced a popula16. Blum, Taxation and the Economy, 5 UNIv. OF CHI. L. SCHOOL REc. 21
(No. 3, 1956). Otto Gerisch observed as early as 1904 that German trades
unions had imposed stability upon their memberships through benefit programs
and he argued that, if such programs were extended to the political arena,
they would give a powerful advantage to those managing the new prudential,
MICHELS, POLITiCAL PARTIES 117-18 (Eden and Cedar Paul Transl. 1915).
17. FALK, op. cit. supra note 15, at 45.
18. PARKER, SOCIAL SECURITY RESERVES 106-12 (1942), for the sad experience
with teachers' funds and 91-92 for the experience with ministers' funds. See
also GRAVES, UNwoFmV STATE ACTION 156-57 (1934), for the early operation of
teachers' retirement funds.
19. JAQUES, THE CHANGING CULTURE OF A FACTORY 145-46 (1952), wherein
the problem of avoiding the unfortunate results of senior influence is dealt
with on the union-employee level.
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tion considerably younger than the national average.
All of this adds up to a mass of complex problems growing more
complicated by the year-and doing so without much notice from the
students of law or the social sciences. But it is not upon any of the
above that Father Harbrecht has chosen to dwell in his study. It is
true that he has briefly outlined the history of the pension movement.
He has also set forth the chief legal problems faced by the courts in
determining the nature of a pension trust, so-called. He also considers the effect the employee security movement has had, and must
continue to have, upon the individual worker in his job relationship.
But beyond all this, Father Harbrecht has chosen to stress the impact
of the accumulation of wealth by the pension movement upon the
entire economy. At first, in the presence of the importance of the
other problems first enumerated in this review, this seems strange;
and yet, given the facts as set forth in his theory of the paraproprietal
society, it is fully understandable. Perhaps a quote from Hannah
Arendt best expresses the reason why: "The development of the
modern age and the rise of society, where the most private of all
human activities, laboring, has become public and been permitted to
establish its own common realm, may make it doubtful whether the
very existence of property as a privately held place within the world
'21
can withstand the relentless process of growing wealth."
It is the thesis of Father Harbrecht, perhaps as the result of his
studying with A. A. Berle, that the split between ownership and
management first noted by Berle in 1928, has been steadily widening
with the rise in the importance of the institutional holder of corporate
securities. 22 Today, there exist the various employee security funds,
investment trusts, and trust accounts, all free to invest in corporate
securities on a scale forbidden to insurance companies and banks,
and all accumulating investment resources at a great rate. In addition,
the management of these monies has been increasingly absorbed by a
trifling number of trust companies and trust officers concentrated in
New York City. What the federal old-age and survivors' insurance
fund has always been forbidden to do, is now done by private pension
funds on a most influential scale.23
It is with the effect of this that Father Harbrecht deals at length,
both those that might be considered good and those that most would

20. HOOVER'& RATCHFORD, EcoNoMIc RESOURCES

27 (1951).

AND PocIEs OF THE SOUTH

21. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 97 (1958). This does not imply that
Father Harbrecht shares the neo-Augustinian excesses of Professor Arendt.
22. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928), as well as
more recent writers mentioned in HARBRECHT at 24 n. 25.
23. For the reasons why the federal fund's managers cannot acquire corporate securities or the bonds of foreign governments, see Myers, Actuarial
Aspects of Financing Old Age and Survivors' Insurance, 16 SOCIAL SECURITY
BULL. 3-5 (No. 6, 1953).
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consider bad in their economic results. Among those that could be
considered good is the increased stability in the stock market which
the steady purchases of the pensions systems entail. In addition, the
old deficiencies of individual grants of stock to employees are
obviated by the consolidation of small single amounts into large aggregates which can earn far more than lesser sums and which can be
more intelligently invested by a trust officer than by the average
inexperienced worker.24 The negative aspect of this is the steady
inflation in the price of "blue-chips" produced by the preference of
institutional investors for them, coupled with the danger of the dumping of such securities by hard-pressed funds during a prolonged period
of economic depression.
These problems, however, seem insignificant alongside the question
-to what purpose do the trust officers controlling the financial aspect of institutional investment exercise that power in the national
corporate structure? Although most employee security funds are
administered by the employer, it is the rare situation in which he
invests the assets of the fund, while the labor leaders in charge of
union-controlled funds are even more reluctant to participate in planning the particular investments of the funds. The result is a dual
administration in which on one side the employer (or the union or a
joint board of employer, union, or employee representatives) administers the operation of the benefit aspects of the program, while
on the other side a corporate fiduciary manages the investment of
the program's reserves. This practice is strengthened by a growing
belief in legislatures and courts that there is something improper
in the merger of the two functions. So strong has this attitude become, that in 1958 the Sears Roebuck fund, despite over four decades
of success under a highly merged form of operation, adopted a division
of responsibility for management and investment purposes, as a
direct result of congressional criticism. 25 In addition, the regulations
of the United States' Internal Revenue Service have made the
position of a non-insured pension fund with an independent trust
26
investment fiduciary a popular and assured one.
The consequence is that corporate fiduciaries in the persons of their
trust officers have in their control the power of investment of huge
sums of money to which legal title is held by an assortment of unincorporated associations, common law, business, express statutory, or
pension trusts (of which many are merely constructive or resulting),
charitable or educational or religious institutions, and a wide variety
24. For problems in individual grants of stock see FARRELL, Op. cit. supra
note 12, at 160-62. For a statement of the workers' indifference to the sources
of their return from work, see Russell, THE RIGHT To BE HAPPY 117-20 (1927).
25. HARBREcHT at 89, quoting company publications.
26. Id. at 124-25, 159-61.
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of other forms of organization not excluding personal and estate
trust accounts. Many of those holding legal title in turn merely hold
it for the equitable benefit and title of other natural and legal entities. The result is a peculiar premium upon paralysis strikingly
similar to the declarations of a man previously non-political in his
life's actions who, having been drawn into running for public office,
announces in his campaign literature that he is "above" politics since
he is not a "politician." The trust officers and their employers, the
corporate fiduciaries,2 7 boast that they are "neutral" in the affairs
of any company in which they hold blocks of stock and that they
would never vote the stock held by them on behalf of others in a
"partisan" way. In actuality, if the Montgomery Ward proxy fight is
indicative, these corporate fiduciaries do vote the stock controlled by
them in order to sustain incumbent management. 28 The resulting
irony is exquisite when one considers how "labor money" has thereby
been used to protect capitalists whose outspoken opposition to organized labor has been as well known as that of Mr. Sewell Avery.
Yet, the protestations of innocence must be taken seriously as general
declarations of policy to be subject only to exception in affairs as
extraordinary as that of the proxy battle at Montgomery Ward.
The effect of such a policy is to release a block of stock in some of
the most economically significant corporations from any concern
in the affairs of the corporation issuing it. The divorce of ownership
and control is carried to a still further degree thereby and the very
least that can result is a need for fewer shares to effectively control
a corporation under normal conditions. But this does not state the
whole problem. It seems to this reviewer that Father Harbrecht, in
concentrating on the economic effect of corporate securities held by
such institutional investors as pension funds, has not examined
sufficiently into the causes for the choice of neutrality. Although, on
the legal level of formal capacity, the corporate fiduciary has huge
powers over corporate securities invested by him, his actual ability
to effectively exercise this power is sharply orbited by many factors.
It is probably on the level of administration that these limits lie, but
they are very real all the same.
As C. Northcote Parkinson has told us, it has often happened in
past history that a functionary in whose office is concentrated great
power or wealth may be taught by his culture for its own protection
to internalize certain sets of controls which confine him in a narrower
27. Although corporate fiduciary applies only to trust companies with the
power to purchase and manage corporate securities as opposed to banks and
insurance companies which often are forbidden from so doing, what is said
herein about the influence of such diverted funds has the widest application.
28. HARBRECHT at 116. Probably, the Fairbanks Morse proxy fight, if closely
studied, would support this statement.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

scope than would otherwise be the case.29 It appears that this has
happened in our culture in the case of the institutional investors.
Already in the case of employee security funds, an established custom
has grown up separating the administration of benefits from the
investment of reserves. Along with this, there is no reason to believe
that the administrators of corporate fiduciaries are not as bound down
in decision-making by the bureaucratic technology of our culture as
any other administrative group. The case of common trust funds are
pertinent on this point. Banks were first permitted to set these up
after 1933 in order to invest collectively the assets of smaller trusts.
By 1958 there were 325 common trust funds, composed of 104,000
participating accounts, with total assets of over $2/2 billion. These
have not kept pace in growth with the mutual investment funds
which since 1938 have increased from 460,000 shareholder accounts
totaling $500 million to 4,500,000 accounts totaling $15,750,000,000.
Although performing very similar functions, the former are sharply
limited in the manner of their operation because of the prejudice
existing at the time of their organization that opposed the involvement of savings banks in the general investment business. For
reasons that seem exclusively the product of administrative reluctance
to incur the risks of change, this difference is still maintained; 30 and
it is intimately connected with a similar conservatism affecting the
flexibility of investment operations of the pension funds. A reluctance
to change by one type of institution engaging in similar work has
a deadening effect upon the whole field of operations within that area. 31
It may be concluded, therefore, that the decision, abdicating the
power inherently their's by reason of their holdings, made by the
corporate fiduciaries, may be an irreversible one. The momentum of
administrative machinery is in its own right nothing to lightly
disregard. If such is the case, the situation is much more serious than
that visualized by Father Harbrecht. Far from there having been
created potentially dominant entities capable of undermining the
democratic methods of our political system by the extent of their
operations, there has been, instead, a development of aggregations
of paralyzed wealth. The workers who are the beneficiaries of the
accumulation are too far removed in their equitable position to understand or effectively influence the operation of their security funds'
investment, or the manipulation of that investment for the control
of the corporations in which the investments are made. The em29. PARKNsoN, THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 58-73 (1958).
30. N. Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1960, p. 52, quoting a speech to the American
Bankers Association by Charles G. Young, senior trust officer, City National
Bank and Trust Company, Kansas City, Mo.
31. Ibid., quoting Frank L. Griffin, who contended insurance companies managing pension programs "had lagged in making innovations."
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ployers and the unions, even if the latter should succeed in getting
representation in the management of fund benefits, are forbidden by
law or custom from attempting to exercise effective power in the
making of investments, or in directing the results flowing from the
making of investments. The corporate fiduciaries are so orbited by
their own concept of duty and by laws regulating their management
of funds, which they handle for investment, that they cannot often
employ the power normally inherent in the control over large blocks
of corporate securities.
Beyond a doubt, what is set up here is a situation ideal for being
used to advantage by men of action. On the economic level, corporate officers can be expected to calculate around huge blocks of
neutralized stock or towards an occasional personally beneficial employment of such stock in particularly pressing cases.' Politically,
such sums of capital without effective management for all purposes
call for an exercise of power by politicians in both the legislative and
executive branches of the government. In either case, the divorce of
ownership from control, described by Berle, and the divorce of
wealth from property, mentioned by Arendt, are both fostered; and
the base of a pluralistic, individualized, and democratic society is
further weakened. 32 And, to compound the difficulty, the weakening
comes in a way almost impossible to correct because it is of a nature
so negative that the ordinary prohibitory statute cannot reach it.
The effect of Father Harbrecht's book on this reader was a more
pessimistic one than even the author's own dour conclusions, in
which he calls for the common man to realize his personality in spheres
other than the purely economic from which he can expect to be increasingly excluded. This may be a solution so long as the "neutrally"
controlled economy continues to provide a surplus, although the
critics of mass culture would deny the likelihood, or even the possibility, of such a development. 33 But such a phrase as "neutral control" is a hopeless contradiction. One who believes that such a
system simply waits for its controller ought not to be regarded as
another Zephaniah, who saw the end of the world in the arrival of a
few Scythian barbarians among the cultured places of his civilization.
Certainly, the very least one can do is to join Father Harbrecht and
others in urging the informed segment of our population to further
educate itself in a bit of knowledge whose component elements are
all about us.
Father Harbrecht's book makes a good beginning in this process of
32. HURST, LAW AND CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNITED STATES 23-29 (1956), states most strongly the property base of American democracy.
33. Rosenberg, Mass Culture in America, in
CULTURE: THE POPULAR ARTS IN AMERICA 9 (1957).
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self-learning. Parts of it do make tedious reading, since there is a
certain quantity of factual material which must be driven into the
reader's mind if he is to comprehend the existence of the problem.
These sections do not make palatable reading, but it would be unfair
to criticise the book's style from these. Certainly, in its summarizing
parts, most notably the chapter on "Property in Transition" and
the one on "The Paraproprietal Society," the manner is most
persuasive. 34 It is not possible to draw material together in a different
synthesis, especially where the main argument is so dependent upon
the conveyance of facts to serve as the base for the new position,
without incurring the charge of difficult, dull, or destructive. But
the world we live in is a complex one. The understanding of its
complexities depends upon the mastery of a great deal of dull detail.
And the failure to do so will certainly end in the destruction of
everything the critic thinks significant. In the final sense, Father
Harbrecht's book is important, which must serve as his ultimate
justification. The reader who recognizes that will not be put off by
the fact that the book is no easier than its subject matter.
EARL FINBAR MURPHY** Assistant

Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law.

34. Others, at much earlier dates, have felt the accumulation of wealth and
its concomitant isolation from individual control imposed by modern industrial

society must adversely affect political democracy. See PARKINSON, Op. Cit.
supra note 29, citing William Morris at 227, George Bernard Shaw at 230-231,
Hilaire Belloc at 231-235, and Mahatma Gandhi at 196.

